The people of Turkey and Kurdistan are holding their breath, eagerly awaiting the message to be sent by Abdullah Öcalan.

Following two meetings between the Imrali delegation of the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) and Abdullah Öcalan, the DEM Party announced that Öcalan had sent a letter to the management of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Europe and Kandil. After the delegation’s visit to Southern Kurdistan, all eyes have once again turned to the upcoming application to the Ministry of Justice and the anticipated meeting with Öcalan.

The differences in approach between the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) regarding this process have also become a subject of debate amid all these developments. Similar approaches in the past have prevented processes that could have fostered hope and led to potential negotiations.

The Turkish state did not lift the isolation imposed on Öcalan, failed to implement legal reforms, and insisted on unilateral disarmament during the process publicly known as the “Oslo talks,” effectively leading to the collapse of the process. This pattern of obstruction has been a key factor in the failure of previous peace efforts.

What happened during the Oslo talks?

To understand what transpired during the Oslo talks, let’s take a look at some excerpts from Amed Dicle’s book, which documents the events of that period.

Preparations began in Brussels in November 2007

The preparations for the Oslo talks began with the first meeting, held in Brussels on 1 November 2007. This initial gathering, mediated by a Norwegian delegation, was attended by Sabri Ok representing the Kurdish side, and Emre Taner, the Undersecretary of the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT), representing the Turkish side. The meeting was significant as it allowed both sides to assess each other’s stance. However, the process came to a halt due to Ankara’s strategy of militarily weakening the PKK before engaging in negotiations.

The first Oslo meeting took place on 3-4 September 2008

Mediating institutions made efforts to ensure that the talks would continue. On January 21, 2008, a meeting was held in Geneva with the Kurdish side to assess the situation. During this period, indirect messages between the Turkish state and the PKK continued. However, it was clear that more concrete steps were needed for both sides to come to the negotiation table directly.

A meeting in Geneva on July 3, 2008, laid the groundwork for direct negotiations. Norwegian, British, and United Nations-backed mediators facilitated the process. Both the Turkish and Kurdish sides met at this stage and agreed on the necessity of continuing the negotiations. Following this, on August 27, 2008, a preparatory meeting was held in Erbil (Hewlêr), during which the PKK finalized the delegation that would participate in the Oslo talks.

Representatives from Kandil took part in the meetings

The Oslo process officially began on 3-4 September 2008. Representing the PKK in the talks were Mustafa Karasu, Sozdar Avesta, and Zübeyir Aydar, while the Turkish side was represented by Afet Güneş, Deputy Undersecretary of the MIT, along with her team. The first point of contention in the negotiations was whether the mediating institutions would be present at the table. The Turkish side opposed the involvement of a third party, whereas the Kurdish side insisted on their presence. In the end, a compromise was reached, allowing the mediators to participate in the opening and closing sessions of the talks.

 Öcalan must be recognized as a direct interlocutor

During the meeting held in Kandil on 4 December 2008, the parties discussed confidence-building measures. The PKK declared that it would maintain the ceasefire, while the Turkish state demanded an end to PKK operations and a withdrawal beyond the borders. Throughout the negotiations, the PKK repeatedly emphasized that Öcalan must be recognized as a direct interlocutor.

In January 2009, a new meeting was organized in Brussels by a mediating institution. The Kurdish side presented its demand for democratic autonomy in greater detail, while the Turkish side insisted that the PKK initiate a disarmament process. However, no agreement was reached on how the process would be implemented.

Hakan Fidan participated in the talks

Throughout 2009, the negotiations continued, with pressure being placed on the PKK to maintain the ceasefire. However, the PKK made it clear that it would not take unilateral steps and emphasized that the Turkish state must provide constitutional guarantees for Kurdish political rights.

In 2010, Hakan Fidan joined the talks on behalf of MIT, marking an increase in the state’s commitment to the process. During this period, proposals were made to institutionalize the negotiations further. However, domestic political developments in Turkey hindered the progress of the Oslo process. As the Turkish state failed to take concrete steps and intensified its demands, the PKK warned that it could suspend the process if its demands were not met.

The Turkish state took no steps

The PKK demanded the lifting of Öcalan’s isolation and the formalization of the process, while the Turkish side continued to impose disarmament conditions. By mid-2011, as the Turkish state escalated its military operations, the negotiations came to a standstill.

In the final meetings, the Kurdish side insisted that legal reforms in Turkey were necessary for the success of the negotiation process, but even these demands were ignored. The last Oslo meetings were marked by heated debates. As no common ground was reached, the talks effectively came to an end.  Following the final meeting, the Kurdish side held the Turkish state responsible for the failure of the process.

The state failed to provide assurances

The Oslo talks became the first comprehensive direct negotiation process between the Turkish state and the PKK, marking a significant moment in history. However, due to the state’s unreliable approach and shifting political dynamics, no lasting agreement was reached. Although some positive messages were conveyed during the process, they ultimately failed to change the outcome.

Clashes escalated again in 2012

After the Oslo process came to an end, clashes intensified once again in 2012. In later analyses, several key factors were identified as the main reasons for the failure of the talks: the Turkish state’s insistence on unilateral disarmament, its refusal to lift Öcalan’s isolation, and the absence of any legal or constitutional reforms. However, the experience gained during this period paved the way for the resolution process that took place between 2013 and 2015 on İmralı Island.